UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	} BILED
Plaintiff,	Adv 3 1991
vs.	Jank C. Silver, Clerk
ONE 1989 MERCURY SABLE, VIN 1MEBM534KA610510) (623
Defendant.)CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C-253-B
and	
PETER J. MCMAHON, JR.,)
Plaintiff,)
vs.)
HAROLD ADAIR, Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration,)))
Defendant.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-0078-B

JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE

IT NOW APPEARS that the forfeiture proceeding herein has been fully compromised and settled. Such settlement more fully appears by the written Settlement Agreement entered into by and between Peter J. McMahon, Jr. and the United States of America and filed herein, to which Settlement Agreement reference is hereby made and is incorporated herein.

It further appearing that pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Peter J. McMahon, Jr. and the United States consent to the forfeiture of the \$1,000 in lieu of the defendant Mercury Sable in full settlement of case no. 91-C-0078-B and case no. 90-C-623-B with no admission of fault on the part

of any party in these lawsuits.

It further appearing that there are no potential claimants to the defendant Mercury Sable and the \$1,000.00 which is being forfeited in lieu thereof, and that no other person has any right, title, or interest in the defendant property.

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion of Catherine J. Depew, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and with the consent of Peter J. McMahon, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, it is

ORDERED AND DECREED that the \$1,000.00 cashier's check made payable to the United States Department of Justice be and hereby is, condemned as forfeited to the United States of America and shall remain in the custody of the United States Marshal for disposition according to law, and it is

FURTHERED ORDERED AND DECREED that the United States Marshal shall return to the claimant Peter J. McMahon, Jr., or his agent, the defendant 1989 Mercury Sable.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED FOR ENTRY:

CATHERINE J. DEPEN

Assistant United States Attorney

3900 U.S. Courthouse

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

JO STANLEY GLENN

homas R. Britt

Attorney for Defendant-1154 E. 61st Street

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136

(918) 749-5531

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	FILED
Plaintiff,	AU0 11 1991
vs.	Jack C. Silver, Clerk
ONE 1989 MERCURY SABLE, VIN 1MEBM534KA610510 Defendant.)))CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C-265-B
and)
PETER J. MCMAHON, JR.,))
Plaintiff,))
vs.)
HAROLD ADAIR, Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration,	
Defendant.	CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-0078-B

JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE

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of any party in these lawsuits.

It further appearing that there are no potential claimants to the defendant Mercury Sable and the \$1,000.00 which is being forfeited in lieu thereof, and that no other person has any right, title, or interest in the defendant property.

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THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED FOR ENTRY:

CATHERINE J. DEPEN

Assistant United States Attorney

3900 U.S. Courthouse

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

JO STANKEY GLENN

omas R. Butt

Attorney for Defendant-1154 E. 61st Street

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136

(918) 749-5531

FILED
) AND MET
Jack C. Selver, Clerk U.S. DISTRACT COURT
)))CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C- 263 -B
)
)
)
)
)))
)CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-0078-B

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

The parties in the above-styled actions, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), stipulate as follows:

- (1) Peter J. McMahon, Jr., stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted and arising out of case no. 91-C-0078-B; and
- (2) The United States, by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Catherine J. Depew, Assistant United States Attorney, stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all

claims asserted and arising out of case no. 90-C-623-B.

APPROVED AT TO FORM AND CONTENT:

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney on behalf of Harold Adair

Assistant United States Attorney

. MCMAHON, TR.

Defendant

JO STANLEY GLENN

Attorney for Defendant

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	, FILED
Plaintiff,	AUG 5 (199)
vs.	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
ONE 1989 MERCURY SABLE, VIN 1MEBM534KA610510 Defendant.)))CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C- 263 -B
and	
PETER J. MCMAHON, JR.,))
Plaintiff,))
vs.))
HAROLD ADAIR, Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration,)))
Defendant.))CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-0078-B

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

The parties in the above-styled actions, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), stipulate as follows:

- (1) Peter J. McMahon, Jr., stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted and arising out of case no. 91-C-0078-B; and
- (2) The United States, by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Catherine J. Depew, Assistant United States Attorney, stipulates to the dismissal with prejudice of all

claims asserted and arising out of case no. 90-C-623-B.

APPROVED AT TO FORM AND CONTENT:

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

on behalf of Harold Adair

, ,

CATHERINE J. DEPEW

Assistant United States Attorney

7/31/91 DATE

PETER V. MCMAHON, TR.

Defendant

7/30/9/ /m/

JO STANLEY GLENN

Attorney for Defendant

8/15/91

DATE

SAM JORGENSON,)
Plaintiff,	}
vs.) Case No. 90-C-960-B
CASE CORPORATION,)
Defendant.)

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL

The parties hereto, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree that the above-captioned matter shall be dismissed with prejudice against defendant, Case Corporation, with each party to bear their own costs.

SAM JORGENSON, Plaintiff

BY:

Rick Paynter, OBA #11149 STIPE, GOSSETT, STIPE, HARPER,

ESTES, MCCUNE & PARKS

P.O. Box 701110

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74170

CASE CORPORATION, Defendant

MONNET, HAYES, BULLIS, THOMPSON

& EDWARDS

1719 First National Center West Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

(405) 232-5481

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUG 2	0 1991	(LAN)
ack C S	ilvar C	larle.

L. D. ROGERS,	§	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
,	§	U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	
VS.	§	Case No. 89-C-314-B
	§	
SHERIFF HAROLD LAY, In his	§	
official capacity as Sheriff	§	
of Nowata County,	§	
	§	
Defendant	§	

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On this the 12th day of July, 1991 Plaintiff, L.D. Rogers', Application for Attorney's and Costs came on for hearing. Appearing for the Plaintiff was Mr. Robert L. Briggs. appearing for the Defendant was Richard Blakely, Assistant District Attorney Tulsa county.

A. FINDINGS OF FACT

At the conclusion of the hearing the Court found the following facts to be true and correct:

- 1. Plaintiff was the prevailing party in his action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, having been awarded \$46,000.00 by the jury empaneled to hear this cause;
- 2. Plaintiff failed to follow Local Court Rule 6(E) in his failure to file the required form to tax costs pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59(d) and thus the issue of costs was never set before the Court Clerk for hearing;
- 3. Pursuant to affidavit and exhibits filed with this application, the only clearly recognizable cost incurred by Plaintiff which is properly taxed as costs in this case is the filing fee of \$120.00.

- 4. Plaintiff, reasonably and necessarily incurred a lodestar amount of attorney's fee of \$14,735.25, which was incurred at the stipulated reasonable hourly rate of \$90.00 per hour;
- 5. That Plaintiff's counsel tried the case in a lawyerly manner and achieved significant results on behalf of the Plaintiff and ran the risk of entering a contingency agreement with Plaintiff; and
- 6. That Gregory D. Bledsoe, an attorney at law practicing in this community and experienced in civil rights cases has testified by affidavit and stipulation of Defendant's counsel that a reasonable and customary charge for the services rendered by Mr. Briggs on behalf of the Plaintiff is \$125.00 to \$150.00 per hour;

After having found these facts, the Court concludes the following to be the law governing these facts and by which it enters this order.

A. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR COSTS

- 6. Plaintiff is entitled to tax as part of the judgment entered herein those costs which are allowed by law pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59(d). However Local Court Rule 6(E) requires the prevailing party make application with sufficient showing on a form provided by the Court Clerk so as to enable the Court Clerk to enter an order taxing all appropriate costs against the losing party. As a matter of law the only showing of costs made by Plaintiff is the filing fee of \$120.00.
- 7. It is therefore order that Plaintiff recover of and from the Defendant the sum of \$120.00 for all costs incurred in this case.

B. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEE

8. 42 U.S.C.A. §1988 authorizes the Court to grant Plaintiff an award for attorney's fee incurred in the prosecution of his claim for civil rights violations.

9. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) sets forth those factors to be considered by this court in setting an attorney's fees award under § 1988. Such factors include the time and labor required in the case, the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the customary fee for similar work in the community, and the relative success of the Plaintiff in the results obtained, etc.).

10. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987); and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 US 424 (1983) authorize this Court to enhance the lodestar amount when Counsel has run a risk in the litigation by agreeing to take the case on a contingency and the Plaintiff was unable to meet the requisite resources to pay Counsel's hourly fee. It is thus appropriate to enhance the lodestar amount for Plaintiff's fees in the instant case.

It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff shall recover of and from the Defendant the sum of \$17,750.00 for fees and all other costs than those awarded above. This is an enhancement of Counsel's regular hourly rate of \$90.00 per hour to \$120.00 per hour.

By this order, Plaintiff, in addition to the judgment entered previously in this case shall likewise recover from the Defendant the sum of \$17,870.00 for fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this cause.

IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED this 12th day of July, 1991

ÍSTRICT COURT JUDGE

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA AUG 20 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LYNN MARTIN, Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of Labor,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

Case No. 90-C-361-B

MAYES COUNTY, OKLAHOMA,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes on for consideration upon the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Mayes County, Oklahoma (County).

On April 25, 1990, the Secretary of Labor filed a Complaint alleging that Mayes County, State of Oklahoma, had, since 1987, employed certain employees for periods in excess of 40 hours per work week without compensating them at a rate of one and one-half times the rate at which they were regularly compensated. County now brings this Motion for Summary Judgment as to those employees who were duly authorized, salaried, deputy sheriffs during the period of time in question. The Motion does not relate to other employees of County who are also relevant to the instant action.

The Secretary admits that, at the time this action was filed, the law in the Tenth Circuit, regarding whether road deputies employed by county governments were covered by the Fair Labor

47

Standards Act of 1938.¹, was unclear. However, at such time there were several opinions favorable² to the Secretary's position in the Fourth Circuit. Cure v. Reavis, 740 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 847 (1987). The recent case of Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101 (10th Cir. 1990) is directly in conflict with Reavis and Gregory, supra, on the issue of whether deputy sheriffs were members of a Sheriff's personal staff, Nichols holding they are members.

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 805 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1986). cert den. 480 U.S. 947 (1987). In Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317 (1986), it is stated:

"The plain language of Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a

¹ 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

These opinions, "favorable" to the Secretary, involved Title VII claims, and are favorable to the Secretary by analogy. The rulings involved the issue whether deputy sheriffs were members of the Sheriff's personal staff, both cases deciding they were not. The "personal staff" exception in the Fair Labor Standards Act is essentially the same as the "personal staff" exception in Title VII. It is generally conceded the exception would receive the same treatment in both contexts. Brewer v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1986).

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

To survive a motion for summary judgment, nonmovant "must establish that there is a genuine issue of material facts..." Nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." <u>Matsushita v. Zenith</u>, 475 U.S. 574, 585, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, (1986).

Based upon the authority of <u>Nichols</u>, *supra*, the Court concludes Mayes County deputy sheriffs, so employed within the time frame of the instant action, were and are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. These deputy sheriffs are: Gary Cochran, Jerry Allen Douglas, Donna Leeann Edwards, Albert Lee McKee, Ralph Sanders, Bryan L. Ward, Ronnie G. Riley and Michael Theys.

The Court concludes Mayes County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on the issue above stated, should be and the same is hereby SUSTAINED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

day of August, 1991.

•	8-20	.91
	• • •	

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER
& SMITH, INC.,

Plaintiff,

V.

Case No. 91-C-568-B

SUSAN P. COBEY and
KIM GUTHERY,

Defendants.

STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL OF ACTION AND RELEASE OF BOND

Plaintiff Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Defendants Susan P. Cobey and Kim Guthery, hereby stipulate that all claims asserted by each party against the other parties in the above styled action are hereby dismissed with prejudice, including but not limited to Plaintiff's application for contempt citation, each party to bear its own costs. The parties further

stipulate that the Corporate Surety Bond posted by Plaintiff in this action on August 12, 1991, may be immediately released to Plaintiff.

JOHN S. ATHENS, OBA #365 TONY W. HAYNIE, OBA #10888

Βy

CONNER & WINTERS 2400 First National Tower Tulsa, OK 74103 (918) 596-5711

Attorneys for Plaintiff, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC.

PATRICK O. WADDEL JOHN HENRY RULE

Bv

GABLE & GOTWALS Suite 2000 15 West 6th Street Tulsa, OK (918) 582-9201

Attorneys for Defendants, SUSAN P. COBEY and KIM GUTHERY

MELISSA STITES, Plaintiff, Plaintiff, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA CASE NO. 91-C-497-B Plaintiff, DOK C. Silver, Clork O'STRUCT COURT

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST CERTAIN DEFENDANTS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

Now on this day of lug-1991, this cause comes on for a hearing before the undersigned judge of the United States District Court of the Northern District of Oklahoma, the plaintiff having filed herein her motion to dismiss her claim against certain defendants, an good cause having been shown, it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff's claim against defendants Lewis Sullivan, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and Edward Mercado be and is hereby dismissed.

INITED STATES DISTRICT HIDGE

LEWIS SULLIVAN, ET AL.

Defendants.

F 1 . E.D MUS 20 1881 S

RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION,	
Plaintiff,	}
vs.	No. 91-C-607-C
TOM J. MANAR,))
Defendant.)

ORDER

The Court has examined the Order entered by the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, in which that court stated that the above-styled case was incorrectly transferred to this Court. Upon consideration the case will be returned.

It is the Order of the Court that this action is hereby transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.

IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of August, 1991.

Chief Judge, U. S. District Court

)
)
) No. 90-C-891-C
FILED IN OPEN COURT
) IN OPEN COURT
) AUG 2 0 1991
Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
) No. 89-C-1049-C
))
)))
)
) No. 90-C-877-C
)
)))

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to this Court's Order of July 12, 1991, (the "Hearing Order"), a hearing was held before this Court upon the Settlement Agreement dated June 28, 1991, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", in the above entitled consolidated actions (the "OTASCO Litigation"). It appears that due notice of the hearing was given in accordance with the

Hearing Order to all persons eligible to participate as members of the class certified for the purpose of settlement only pursuant to the Hearing Order (the "Class). The settling parties appeared by their respective counsel of record and the Court heard argument from counsel. An opportunity to be heard has been given to all persons desiring to be heard or to object to the proposed settlement and the proposed settlement has been fully considered by the Court.

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. On or before July 16, 1991, the Notice of Class Action and Settlement Hearing (the "Notice") was sent to:

ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE OTASCO EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT TRUST (the "TRUST") WHO, AT ANY TIME ON OR AFTER JANUARY 31, 1988, HAD ANY INTEREST IN CLASS "A" COMMON STOCK OF OTASCO HOLDING, CORP.

- 2. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), the Court has previously determined this Action shall proceed as a class action for settlement purposes only as described in the Court's Order dated July 11, 1991.
- 3. Due and adequate notice of the proceedings has been provided to members of the Class, a full opportunity has been offered to the Class to participate in this hearing, and it is hereby determined that all members of the Class are bound by the Order and Final Judgment entered herein.
- 4. The Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Trust, its participants, and current and former owners of holding stock, and is hereby approved by the Court. The Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, costs and expenses in the following amounts are hereby approved as fair and reasonable:

Attorneys' fees:

\$1,525,000.00

Costs and expenses:

\$ 44,141.94.

5. The OTASCO Litigation and all claims which the plaintiffs or the members of the Class, as defined in the Hearing Order, or any of them ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may have by reason of or arising out of or relating to any of the facts, transactions, actions or conduct, actual or purported, alleged or which could have been alleged in the OTASCO Litigation, in any of the complaints in the actions consolidated herein, or which were or could have been alleged in any other forum, including without limitation, any and all matters arising out of or relating to the OTASCO Litigation or in any of the complaints in the King action, Nagel action, and/or Headley action, or arising out of the OTASCO Transaction as defined in the Settlement Agreement or the subsequent events arising therefrom, are dismissed on the merits and with prejudice and with respect to Henry G. Will, Edgar R. Sanditen, Arthur A. McNatt, Abe Brand, Jerry L. Goodman, Edmund J. Farrell, Robert E. Shireman, OTASCO Holding, Corp., Goldman, Sachs & Co., McCrory Corporation, Rapid-American Corporation, Houlihan, Lokey, Howard & Zukin, Inc., and Prudential Securities, Inc. (formerly Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.) (collectively the "Settling Defendants"), and each of their present and former respective parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, predecessors, officers, director, employees, insurers, agents, partners, successors, heirs, administrators, executors, assigns, and with the exception stated below, attorneys. Plaintiffs' claims for legal malpractice which have been brought, or which may be brought against Henry G. Will, Conner & Winters, and/or Altheimer & Gray, are expressly reserved but all other claims against Henry G. Will, Conner & Winters, and Altheimer & Gray,

including all claims of breaches of fiduciary duty (except to the extent legal malpractice is considered a breach of fiduciary duty), are released and dismissed on the merits and with prejudice.

- 6. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Class, and each of them, are hereby permanently barred and enjoined from instituting or prosecuting, whether individually, directly, representatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity, any action against the Settling Defendants or other persons which action asserts claims which in any way relate to or which arise out of the OTASCO Transaction or the Plaintiffs' relationship to Otasco or the Trust as those terms are defined in the Settlement Agreement, and/or the claims raised in the OTASCO Litigation and which have been, could have been, or ever could be, now or in the future, asserted against any of the Settling Defendants.
- 7. The claimed damages and injuries to Plaintiffs have arisen out of alleged violations of The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, ("ERISA"), breaches of contract, negligence, fraud, violations of professional standards, breaches of fiduciary duty and otherwise as alleged by Plaintiffs. The damages and injuries which Plaintiffs are claiming were caused by these alleged acts and omissions of the Settling Defendants are the same damages and injuries which Plaintiffs allege have been caused to them by the non-settling Defendants. Nothing in this Order or the Settlement Agreement shall be construed to indicate that the Plaintiffs, by entering into the Settlement Agreement, have admitted they have been fully compensated for their claimed damages and injuries by this settlement.

- 8. The Plaintiffs have not asserted that any person breached any fiduciary duty at any time in or after 1989.
- 9. This Court has fully considered the claims and defenses of each Plaintiff and of each Settling Defendant, has reviewed the amount contributed to the settlement by each Settling Defendant and finds that the contribution of each Settling Defendant is a fair and reasonable contribution to this settlement considering the defenses available. The Settlement Agreement is accordingly approved as fair and reasonable in every respect.
- 10. This Court as a part of its review has fully considered the negotiations that have occurred between the various parties and finds that this Settlement Agreement is non-collusive, and it is therefore further approved as having been made in good faith.
- 11. All claims for contribution and/or indemnity and/or reimbursement on any theory that have been or could be asserted against the Settling Defendants by any party to the OTASCO Litigation and/or the OTASCO Transaction are dismissed with prejudice and/or enjoined and the future filing of such claims is hereby enjoined. Any cross-claim, third party claims, counterclaim or other claims asserted in this action by any party against any Settling Defendant for contribution and/or indemnity and/or reimbursement on any theory is hereby dismissed with prejudice and enjoined. Provided however, Henry Will does not release any claim for indemnification as against OTASCO Holding, Corp. on behalf of Conner & Winters relating to the defense of the legal malpractice claim still pending. Such claim, if any, and all defenses to any such claim, are reserved.
- 12. Except for the express reservation in the preceding paragraph, all claims for contribution and/or indemnity and/or reimbursement on any theory that have been or could

be asserted by any Settling Defendant against any party to the OTASCO Litigation and/or the OTASCO Transaction are barred and the future filing of such claims is hereby enjoined. Any cross-claim, third party claim, counterclaim or any other claim asserted in the OTASCO Litigation by any Settling Defendant against any other party to this action for contribution or indemnity or reimbursement on any theory is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

- 13. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and statements of counsel, and has heard evidence, and hereby expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of the finality of the orders and judgments made in this Order. The Court hereby directs that this order be entered as a final judgment dismissing these actions against the Settlement Defendants. The time to appeal shall run from the date of the entry of such judgment.
- 14. No costs shall be taxed in connection with the OTASCO Litigation, except as provided in paragraph III.F. of the Settlement Agreement and as referred to in the Notice attached to this Court's Hearing Order of July 12, 1991.

Dated: August 1991

United States District Judge

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE AND 10 1981

LARRY HUGGINS,)	J. S. C. Bear, Gark U.S. Dasit of COURT
Pl	laintiff,))	/
v.)) 90:	-C-753-B
ANTHONY L. CARRIER, et al	l. ,))	
De	efendants.))	

ORDER

The court has for consideration the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge filed July 15, 1991, in which the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant, Payne County Sheriff's Department and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Anthony L. Carrier be granted. No exceptions or objections have been filed and the time for filing such exceptions or objections has expired.

After careful consideration of the record and the issues, the court has concluded that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge should be and hereby is affirmed.

It is therefore Ordered that the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant, Payne County Sheriff's Department and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Anthony L. Carrier with regard to Plaintiff's Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are granted.

Dated this day of August, 1991.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ARTHUR	FARAHKHAN,)
	Plaintiff,)
v.) No. 90-C-205-в l
WESTIN TULSA,	HOTEL, WILLIAMS CENTER,	FILED
	Defendant.	AUG 19 1991 (14)
	חוד.	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

In accord with the Order filed this date sustaining the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court hereby enters judgment in favor of the Defendant, Westin Hotel, Williams Center, and against the Plaintiff, Arthur Farahkhan. Plaintiff shall take nothing of his claim. Costs are assessed against the plaintiff and the parties are to pay their respective attorney's fees.

Dated, this $19^{t/2}$ day of August, 1991.

THOMAS R. BRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FILED

U.S. AIR PARTS, INC., an Oklahoma corporation,

and

WESTERN AERO SUPPLY CORPORATION, a Texas corporation,

Plaintiff,

VS.

TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a Teledyne Continental Aircraft Products Division, a California corporation,

and

AVIALL, INC., a Delaware corporation,

and

AVIALL OF TEXAS, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

AUG 1 9 1991 U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 91-C-0100-E

Jury Trial Demanded

STIPLUATION OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and among U.S.
Air Parts, Inc. and Western Aero Supply Corporation, Plaintiffs
in the above-captioned cause, and Teledyne Industries, Inc., one
of the Defendants in the above-captioned cause, through counsel
for each of them, that all actions and claims in this lawsuit
against Teledyne Industries, Inc. be dismissed, without costs or
attorneys' fees as to any party.

U.S. Air parts, inc.

WESTERN AERO SUPPLY CORPORATION

By Edward Malmuel By Edward Malmuel One of Its Attorneys

One of Its Attorneys

TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC.

One of Its Attgrneys

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MARK REED and MICHELLE REED, Husband and Wife,	FILE D
Plaintiffs,	AUG 1 9 1991
and THE TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANIES, a corporation,	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Intervenor,) }
vs.) Case No. 91-C-0031-C
THE TORO COMPANY,)
Defendant.)

ORDER

On this ____ day of August, 1991, Intervenors Withdrawal of Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement came on for consideration. Having considered the withdrawal, it is:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Intervenor's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement and the Opening Brief in Support of Intervenor's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement be withdrawn and expunged from the Court file and returned to counsel for the Intervenor.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this case be dismissed with prejudice.

(Signed) H. Dele Cook

United States District Judge

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AUG 19 1991

ROBERT MICHAEL LANE and RANDALL LEE PITTMAN,	Juck C. Silver, Clark U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiffs,))
v.) Case No. 91-C-580-C
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER AND CANCER INSTITUTE, INC.,)))
Defendant.))

JOINT STIPULATED ORDER TO REMAND

Upon the Joint Motion To Remand And Brief In Support, filed contemporaneously herewith, the Court, for good cause shown, hereby orders that the instant case be remanded to the District Court Of Tulsa County State Of Oklahoma.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the instant case, styled Robert Michael Lane and Randall Lee Pittman v. Memorial Medical Center And Cancer Institute, Inc., Case No. 91-C-580-C, is hereby remanded to the District Court Of Tulsa County State Of Oklahoma.

Dated this 19 day of Gigned, 1991.

(Signed) H. Dale Cook

H. Dale Cook, Judge

Stipulated as to form and substance:

James L Kincaid
W. Kyle Tresch
CROWE & DUNLEVY
Suite 500
321 South Boston
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103-3313
(918) 592-9800

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

J. Warren Jackman
William A. Caldwell
PRAY, WALKER, JACKMAN,
WILLIAMSON, & MARLAR
900 Oneok Plaza
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

William a aldul

(918) 584-4136

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

JAD/scf 08/14/91

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED
AUG 19 1991

THOMAS HARTNESS, and CARRIE)
HARTNESS, a/k/a CARRIE ROBINSON,)
individually and as husband and)
wife,)

Jack C. Silver, Clark U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 91-1-605C

TERRY ALLEN CALLAHAN, an individual, and MITCHELL D. BUSBEE, an individual, d/b/a BUSBEE TRUCKING,

Defendants.

(No. C-91-138PC)
(District Court of Kay County, Oklahoma)

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Transfer filed by the Defendants herein be granted and the Clerk of this Court is directed to transfer this matter from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.

It is so ordered this 19

day of

of \mathcal{A}

1991.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

FILED

IMMUNO MYCOLOGICS, INC., an Oklahoma corporation,

AUG 1 9 1991

Plaintiff,

Jack C. Silver, Clerk
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

vs.

No. 90-C-435-B

SYNTEX INC., a Delaware corporation, SYVA COMPANY, a Delaware corporation and SYNTEX MEDICAL DIAGNOSTICS, a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSING ORDER

Having been advised by the parties that a tentative agreement to settle this matter has been reached by the parties, it is hereby ordered that the Clerk administratively terminate this action in his records, without prejudice to the rights of the parties to reopen the proceedings for good cause shown for the entry of any stipulation or order, or for any other purpose required to obtain a final determination of the litigation.

If, within ninety (90) days, the parties have not reopened for the purpose of obtaining a final determination herein, this action shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this \mathcal{L}^{\wedge} day of August, 1991.

AShomas R. Britt INITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F I L E D IN AND FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUG 1 9 1991

BEVERLY OZMUN,) Jack C. Silver, Clerk) U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff,)
v.	NO. 90 C-989 B
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,	
Defendant.	<u> </u>

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On Motion of Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the subject suit is dismissed without prejudice.

ENTERED this 1991.

Shomas R. Butt Thomas R. Brett, District Judge

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUG 1 6 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

BRISTOL RESOURCES CORPORATION,) an Oklahoma Corporation,)

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 91-C-432 C

S. L. ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P. a Delaware Limited Partnership,

Defendant.

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

The Plaintiff, Bristol Resources Corporation, hereby dismisses the above captioned action without prejudice to filing a future action based on the facts and circumstances alleged herein. Bristol is entitled to dismiss this cause without an Order of this Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), because the adverse party has not been served with the summons issued herein.

Respectfully submitted,

Kenneth F Albright, OBA #00181
Dale Joseph Gilsinger, OBA #10821
Gerald R. Shrader, OBA #13051
ALBRIGHT & GILSINGER
2601 Fourth National Bank Bldg.
15 West Sixth Street
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119

(918) 583-5800

Attorneys for Bristol Resources Corporation

FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUG	1	6	1991	\mathcal{D}^{t}
-----	---	---	------	-------------------

LEROY TABER,)	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff,	j	
v.)	89-C-564-B
ROBERT J. SANDERS,)	
Defendant.)	

ORDER

This order pertains to defendant's Application for Attorney Fees (Docket #11)¹. The application is granted in favor of defendant, Robert J. Sanders, and against the plaintiff, Leroy Taber, in the amount of \$2,203.00.

Dated this 8 day of August, 1991.

JOHN LEO WAGNER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

^{1 &}quot;Docket numbers" refer to numerical designations assigned sequentially to each pleading, motion, order, or other filing and are included for purposes of record keeping only. "Docket numbers" have no independent legal significance and are to be used in conjunction with the docket sheet prepared and maintained by the United States Court Clerk, Northern District of Oklahoma.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,	AUG 1 6 1991
vs.	U.S. Dack C. Flore Congre
CLIFFORD MOSES, et al.,)
Defendants.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 90-C-869-E

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Phil Pinnell, Assistant United States Attorney, gives notice that the Defendants, Bank of Tulsa, as Successor to North Side State Bank and John Doe, Tenant, are dismissed from this foreclosure proceeding pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff would further advise the Court that the Plaintiff has been made aware that the mortgages of Defendant, Bank of Tulsa, as Successor to North Side State Bank, have been assigned and that the subject property is now vacant. Therefore, Defendants, Bank of Tulsa, as Successor to North Side State Bank and John Doe, Tenant, are no longer necessary parties to this case.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney

PHIL PINNELL, OBA #7169

Assistant United States Attorney

3600 U.S. Courthouse Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the $\frac{76}{2}$ day of August, 1991, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid thereon, to:

Clifford Moses 5209 North Frankfort Tulsa, OK 74126

Reba Moses 5209 North Frankfort Tulsa, OK 74126

Bank of Tulsa, as Successor to North Side State Bank 5307 East 41st Street Tulsa, OK 74135

J. Dennis Semler Assistant District Attorney 406 Tulsa County Courthouse Tulsa, OK 74103

Assistant United States Attorney

PP/css

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,	FILED
Plaintiff,)
V.	AUG 1 6 1991
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET. AL., Defendants.	Jack C. Silver, Clark U.S. DISTRICT COURT
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,)
Plaintiff,) Consolidated Cases Nos.
·) CASE NO. 89-C-868-C
v.) CASE NO. 89-C-869-C) CASE NO. 90-C-859-C
SOLVENTS RECOVERY CORP., ET. AL.	į
Defendants.)
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,)
Plaintiff,)
v.))
UNIT RIG & EQUIPMENT CO., ET. AL.))
Defendants.	'

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL, AND VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

PURSUANT TO RULE 41(a)(1) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), all claims which Plaintiff Atlantic Richfield Company has filed in this action against the following six named Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice:

- 1. Advance Chemical Distribution, Inc.;
- 2. Barton Construction;
- Green Country Credit Union, formerly known as Armco Credit Union;
- 4. Piping Engineering Company, Inc.;
- 5. Sears, Roebuck & Company;
- 6. Tulsa Truck Rental.

Gary A. Eaton, OBA #2598 Attorney for Plaintiff 1717 East 15th St. Tulsa, OK 74104 918 743 8717

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned certifies that on <u>August 16, 1991</u>, a true and correct copy of the above instrument / pleading was mailed with postage prepaid to the following persons:

Mr. William Anderson, Attorney at Law and Liaison Counsel and Co-Lead Counsel for Owners and Non-Operator Lessees Group, 320 South Boston Building, Suite 500, Tulsa, OK 74103

Mr. C. S. Lewis, III, Attorney at Law and Co-Lead Counsel for Owners and Non-Operator Lessees Group, P. O. Box 1046, Tulsa, OK 74101

Mr. John Tucker, Lead Counsel for Non Group Generators and Transporters, 2800 Fourth National Bank Building, Tulsa, OK 74119

Mr. Steven Harris, Attorney at Law and Lead Counsel for Operators Group, Suite 260 Southern Hills Tower, 2431 East 61st Street, Tulsa, OK 74136

Mr. Charles Shipley, Attorney at Law and Settlement Coordinator, 3401 First National Tower, Tulsa, OK 74103

Ms. Claire V. Eagan, Mr. Michael Graves, and Mr. Matthew Livingood, Attorneys at Law and Lead Counsel for the Sand Springs PRP Group, 4100 Bank of Oklahoma Tower, One Williams Center, Tulsa, OK 74172

Mr. Larry Gutteridge, co-counsel for the Plaintiff, c/o Sidley & Austin, Attorneys at Law, 633 West 5th Street, Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90071

Name

00 31 199.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

WEST GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 91-C-81-C

THE PARTY PALACE, INC., d/b/a/ DAZZLES, TERESA BROWN and MICHAEL D. HARRIS,

Defendants.

FILED

AUG 1 6 1991

STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL

Jack C. Silver, Clark
U.S. DISTRICE CONT

Pursuant to Rule 41, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all parties hereto by and through their respective counsel of record herewith stipulate that the within styled and numbered cause of action, including all claims and counterclaims, be fow dismissed.

DATED this 13 day of our

JAMES E. POE, OBA #7198 Attorney for Plaintiff

W. C. SELLERS, JR.
Attorney for Defendant
The Party Palace, Inc.
d/b/a/ Dazzles

THOMAS WHALEN

Attorney for Defendant,

Teresa Brown

JOHN R. CASLAVKA

Attorney for Defendant

Wichael Harris

AUG 1 6 1991 8

TULSTAR ENERGY GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KOCH INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 90-C-313-E

Jack C. Silver, Clark U.S. DISTLANT COUR

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSING ORDER

The Court has been advised by counsel that this action has been settled, or is in the process of being settled. Therefore it is not necessary that the action remain upon the calendar of the Court.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk administratively terminate this action in his records, without prejudice to the rights of the parties to reopen the proceedings for good cause shown for the entry of any stipulation, order, judgment, or for any other purpose required to obtain a final determination of the litigation. The Court retains complete jurisdiction to vacate this order and to reopen the action upon cause shown within thirty (30) days that settlement has not been completed and further litigation is necessary.

ORDERED this 16 76 day of August, 1991.

JAMES . ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



	ATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TH DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA	HE T	II		E	D
LEROY TABER,))	1	AUG	16	1991	
Plaintiff,))) 89-C-564	ქუს <u>ს</u> .ა. ნ	. O. S DISTI	VIIV AIC	er, C	lerk DUR
v.) 89-C-564)	4-B				
ROBERT J. SANDERS,)					
Defendant.)					

JUDGMENT

This action came before the court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

It is therefore ordered that judgment is entered in favor of the defendant, Robert J. Sanders, and against plaintiff, Leroy Taber.

Dated this 2 day of August, 1991.

JOHN LEO WAGNER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE



AHC 1 5 1991

GARY BARBEE and PENNY BARBEE, husband and wife,	Jack C. Silver, Class U.S. Distriction of the property of the control of the cont
Plaintiffs,	,
vs.) Case No. 91-C-495-E
NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC., a foreign corporation,)))
Defendant.)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that the Petition and all causes of action of the Plaintiffs filed herein be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice to any further action.

of the state of the same

JAMES O. ELLISON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

Jack C. Silver, Clark
U.S. DIS AMOT COURT

VS.

PRANKYE VALENTIN TORRES

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-309-E

AGREED JUDGMENT

The Court, being fully advised and having examined the court file, finds that the Defendant, Frankye Valentin Torres, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on May 15, 1991. The Defendant has not filed an Answer but in lieu thereof has agreed that Frankye Valentin Torres is indebted to the Plaintiff in the amount alleged in the Complaint and that judgment may accordingly be entered against Frankye Valentin Torres in the principal amount of \$1,302.93, plus interest in the amount of \$61.91 as of March 5, 1991, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 9%, until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the legal rate until paid, plus the costs of this action.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Plaintiff have and recover judgment against the defendant in the principal amount of \$1,302.93, plus interest in the amount of \$61.91 as of March 5, 1991, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 9% per annum until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the current legal rate of 6.26 percent per annum until paid, plus the costs of this action.

S/ JAMES O. ELLISON

THOMAS R. HRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

FRANKYE VALENTIN TORKES

Defendant

the second of th

ROY W. HESS and SHARON L. HESS, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, No. 90-C-350-C vs. MEMBERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, FILED Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, AUG 15 1991 vs. - Jack C. Silver, Clark LINDSEY & NEWSOM CLAIMS SERVICE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT INC., a Texas corporation, Third Party Defendant.

JOURNAL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

The above-styled cause of action came on for Jury Trial on May 20, 1991, with Judge H. Dale Cook presiding. Plaintiffs appeared personally and by counsel, N. Franklyn Casey, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, Members Mutual Insurance Company, appeared personally and by counsel, Jerry D. Stritzke, and Third Party Defendant, Lindsey & Newsom Claims Service, Inc., appeared personally and by counsel, Mary Quinn-Cooper. The parties announced ready for trial and a jury was impaneled to hear the above-styled matter. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs' case and chief, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all causes of action and specifically on the issue of punitive damages. The Court reserved its rulings at that time.

The Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, Members Mutual Insurance Company, dismissed with prejudice its third party claim

against Lindsey & Newsom Claims Service, Inc. Lindsey & Newsom Claims Service, Inc. agreed to waive any claim for attorney's fees or costs that may have been incurred as a result of the abovestyled litigation. Defendant then presented testimony of witnesses and offered additional evidence in support of its case.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, Judge H. Dale Cook sustained the motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages and overruled all remaining motions for directed verdict. The jury was instructed on the applicable law and the issues were submitted for their determination. The jury returned a unanimous verdict awarding damages under the contract in the amount of \$26,650.00. The jury also returned a unanimous verdict finding in favor of the Plaintiff on the claim of bad faith and awarding damages to Roy Hess in the amount of \$25,000.00 and to Sharon Hess in the amount of \$25,000.00.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court that the Plaintiffs, Roy W. Hess and Sharon L. Hess, husband and wife, is granted Judgment against the Defendant, Members Mutual Insurance Company, in the sum of \$76,650.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by this Court that the Plaintiffs are entitled to such costs and attorney's fees as may be hereinafter granted in subsequent applications.

(Signed) H. Dale Cook

JUDGE H. DALE COOK

Approved As To Form and Content:

N. Franklyn Casey Attorney for Plaintiffs Roy W. Hess and Sharon L. Hess

Jerry D. Stritzke, Actorney for Defendant Members Mutual Insurance Company

Mary Quinn-Cooper

Attorney for Third Party Defendant/ Lindsey & Newsom Claims Service, Inc.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

VIRGIL RAY BAXTER a/k/a VIRGIL R.)
BAXTER; DONITA C. BAXTER a/k/a
DONITA CAROLYN BAXTER;
COUNTY TREASURER, Washington
County, Oklahoma; and BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Washington
County, Oklahoma,

Defendants.

FILED

AUG 1 5 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clack U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-417-C

JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE

This matter comes on for consideration this ______ day

of ________, 1991. The Plaintiff appears by Tony M.

Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of

Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States

Attorney; and the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray

Baxter, Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, and County

Treasurer and Board of County Commissioners, Washington County,

Oklahoma, appear not, but make default.

The Court, being fully advised and having examined the court file, finds that the Defendant, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on June 25, 1991; that the Defendant, Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on June 25, 1991; that Defendant, County Treasurer, Washington County, Oklahoma, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on June 20, 1991; and that Defendant, Board of County

NOTE: THIS ORDER IS TO BE MAILED BY MOVANT TO ALL COUNSEL AND PRO SE LITIGANTS IMMEDIATELY, UPON RECEIPT. Commissioners, Washington County, Oklahoma, acknowledged receipt of Summons and Complaint on June 19, 1991.

It appears that the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter, Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, and County Treasurer and Board of County Commissioners, Washington County, Oklahoma, have failed to answer and their default has therefore been entered by the Clerk of this Court.

The Court further finds that on June 15, 1987, Virgil
Ray Baxter and Donita Carolyn Baxter, filed their voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in Chapter 7 in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Oklahoma, Case
No. 87-01594, were discharged on September 30, 1987, and the case
was closed on August 25, 1988.

The Court further finds that this is a suit based upon a certain mortgage note and for foreclosure of a mortgage securing said mortgage note upon the following described real property located in Washington County, Oklahoma, within the Northern Judicial District of Oklahoma:

Lot Fifteen (15) of Eastman Second Addition to Ochelata, Washington County, Oklahoma.

The Court further finds that on November 30, 1983, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, their mortgage note in the amount of \$37,600.00, payable in monthly installments, with interest thereon at the rate of 10.75 percent (10.75%) per annum.

The Court further finds that as security for the payment of the above-described note, the Defendants, Virgil R.

Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home

Administration, a mortgage dated November 30, 1983, covering the above-described property. Said mortgage was recorded on November 30, 1983, in Book 808, Page 739, in the records of Washington County, Oklahoma.

The Court further finds that on November 30, 1983, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, an Interest Credit Agreement to which the interest rate on the above-described note and mortgage was reduced.

The Court further finds that on August 15, 1984, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, an Interest Credit Agreement to which the interest rate on the above-described note and mortgage was reduced.

The Court further finds that on September 11, 1985, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, an Interest Credit Agreement to which the interest rate on the above-described note and mortgage was reduced.

The Court further finds that on September 25, 1986, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, an Interest Credit Agreement to which the interest rate on the above-described note and mortgage was reduced.

The Court further finds that on March 17, 1987, the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter and Donita C. Baxter, executed and delivered to the United States of America, acting through the Farmers Home Administration, an Interest Credit Agreement to which the interest rate on the above-described note and mortgage was reduced.

The Court further finds that the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter and Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, made default under the terms of the aforesaid note, mortgage, and interest credit agreements, by reason of their failure to make the monthly installments due thereon, which default has continued, and that by reason thereof the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter and Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, are indebted to the Plaintiff in the principal sum of \$38,770.48, plus accrued interest in the amount of \$12,785.54 as of October 26, 1990, plus interest accruing thereafter at the rate of 10.75 percent per annum or \$11.4187 per day until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the legal rate until fully paid, and the further sum due and owing under the interest credit agreements of \$7,873.64, plus interest on that sum at the legal rate from judgment until paid, and the costs of

this action in the amount of \$28.00 (\$20.00 docket fees, \$8.00 fee for recording Notice of Lis Pendens).

The Court further finds that the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter, Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, and County Treasurer and Board of County Commissioners, Washington County, Oklahoma, are in default and have no right, title or interest in the subject real property.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Plaintiff have and recover judgment in rem against the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter and Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, in the principal sum of \$38,770.48, plus accrued interest in the amount of \$12,785.54 as of October 26, 1990, plus interest accruing thereafter at the rate of 10.75 percent per annum or \$11.4187 per day until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the current legal rate of because percent per annum until paid, and the further sum due and owing under the interest credit agreements of \$7,873.64, plus the costs of this action in the amount of \$28.00 (\$20.00 docket fees, \$8.00 fee for recording Notice of Lis Pendens), plus any additional sums advanced or to be advanced or expended during this foreclosure action by Plaintiff for taxes, insurance, abstracting, or sums for the preservation of the subject property.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendants, Virgil R. Baxter a/k/a Virgil Ray Baxter, Donita C. Baxter a/k/a Donita Carolyn Baxter, County Treasurer and Board of

County Commissioners, Washington County, Oklahoma, have no right, title, or interest in the subject real property.

Order of Sale shall be issued to the United States Marshal for the Northern District of Oklahoma, commanding him to advertise and sell, according to Plaintiff's election with or without appraisement, the real property involved herein and apply the proceeds of the sale as follows:

First:

In payment of the costs of this action accrued and accruing incurred by the Plaintiff, including the costs of sale of said real property;

Second:

In payment of the judgment rendered herein in favor of the Plaintiff;

The surplus from said sale, if any, shall be deposited with the Clerk of the Court to await further Order of the Court.

and after the sale of the above-described real property, under and by virtue of this judgment and decree, all of the Defendants and all persons claiming under them since the filing of the Complaint, be and they are forever barred and foreclosed of any right, title, interest or claim in or to the subject real property or any part thereof.

(Signed) H. Dale Cook

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED:

TONY M. GRAHAM United States Attorney

PETER BERNHARDT, OBA #741

Assistant United States Attorney

3600 U.S. Courthouse Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 (918) 581-7463

Judgment of Foreclosure Civil Action No. 91-C-417-C

PB/esr

	الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الله
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	Alia 1 5 1991
Plaint iff,	Jack C. Eller, Oran, U.S. Dh GCUR
vs.)
DON I. NELSON, et al.,)
Defendants.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 89-C-775-E

JUDGMENT

This matter comes on for consideration this 15 day of 1991, and pursuant to a stipulation and agreement between the plaintiff, United States of America, by Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Peter Bernhardt, Assistant United States Attorney and Alan R. Woodcock, Office of the Regional Solicitor, Southwest Region, Department of the Interior, and the Defendants, Don I. Nelson, by his attorney Allen Mitchell, and Freddie K. Saliba, by his attorney Lee I. Levinson, the parties hereby agree and the court does render judgment as follows:

- 1. The SE/4 NE/4 SE/4 of Section 13, Township 14 North, Range 10 East, Creek County, Oklahoma was, at all times material hereto, subject to federally imposed restrictions on alienation, pursuant to the Act of August 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 731. Said property was the allotment of Mandy Yargee, Fullblood Creek Indian, Roll No. 3699.
- 2. Warranty deeds executed by Raymond Yargee, dated February 17, 1982, and by Mollie Birdcreek Jones, dated February 22, 1982, to defendant Don I. Nelson are void ab initio for failure to comply with the

Act of August 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 731 which requires that any such deeds be approved by the District Court of Creek County, State of Oklahoma. Said deeds were not so approved. Said deeds, which are recorded at Book 114, pages 1024 and 1025 of the county records of Creek County, Oklahoma, are hereby cancelled of record.

- 3. A warranty deed executed by defendant Don I. Nelson dated March 22, 1982, and recorded at book 125, page 1774 of the county records of Creek County, Oklahoma, is hereby cancelled of record.
- 4. Royalties from oil and gas production from the restricted property identified in paragraph 1 above in the amount of \$91,172.60 were paid by defendants Pride Pipeline Company and Pride Pipeline Limited Partnership to defendants Don I. Nelson and Freddie K. Saliba for which royalties defendants Don I. Nelson and Freddie K. Saliba are jointly and severally liable to the United States for the benefit of the heirs of Mandy Yargee. Judgment is hereby entered against defendants Don I. Nelson and Freddie K. Saliba in favor of the United States for the benefit of the heirs of Mandy Yargee, to wit: Wilson J. Jones, Peggy S. Thompson, Sally R. Lindsey, Wilson J. Jones, Jr., Roger T. Jones, Martha Soto, Joseph J. Jones, Jr., Crystal L. Jones and Andria R. Jones in the principal amount of \$91,172.60, plus interest accrued on said principal amount in the amount of \$108,147.00 from January 3, 1982, until January 31, 1991, plus interest thereafter at the rate of 9.36 percent per annum or \$51.00 per day until judgment, plus interest thereafter at the current legal rate of Land percent per annum until paid, plus all costs of this action.

5. This judgment is into	ended to and does dispose of all iss	ues
between plaintiff and defendants Do	n I. Nelson and Freddie K. Saliba a	lleged
in claims for relief numbers 1 throu		
IT IS SO ORDERED THE	IS, DAY OF,	1991.
	S/ JAMES O. ELLISON	
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND COM	JAMES O. ELLISON United States District Judge	
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CO.	VIEW.	
Lee I have		
LEE I. LEVINSON, OBA #5395		
P.O. Box 14070		
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74159	a 24	
Attorney for Defendant Freddie K.	Saliba	
allen Mittelf	<i>)</i>	
ALLEN MITCHELL, OBA #6264		
P.O. Box 190		
Sapulpa, Oklahoma 74067		
Attorney for Defendant Don 12 Nels	On	
PETER BERNHARDT, OBA #741		
Assistant United States Attorney 3900 U.S. Courthouse		
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 (918) 581-7463		
10 0 .		

ALAN R. WOODCOCK, OBA #9855
Office of the Regional Solicitor
United States Department of the Interior P.O. Box 3156 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74101

FILED

AUG 1 4 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

MARTINAIRE OF OKLAHOMA, INC., a Kansas Corporation))
Plaintiff,	j
v.)
VOICE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, INC. an Oklahoma Corporation) Case No. 91-C-512-E))
Defendant.)

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

The plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 41(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby dismisses the above styled and numbered lawsuit.

PATRICK H. KERNAN, OBA #4983 4500 South Garnett, Suite 900 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74146 (918) 664-1403

Attorney for the Plaintiff Martinaire of Oklahoma, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Patrick H. Kernan, do hereby certify that on the day of August, 1991, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument was mailed, postage prepaid, to Michael D. Conklin, 1512 S. Denver, Tulsa, OK 74119.

J.R. PAYNE CUSTOM VANS & RV'S, INC., an Oklahoma Corporation,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

No. 89-C-040-B

H.B. WOOD and JEAN WOOD,

Defendants,

-vs-

SPORTSCOACH CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, INC., COACHMEN
INDUSTRIES, INC., and
SPARTAN MORTORS, INC.

Additional Parties Defendants.

FILED

AUG 14 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The Court, having before it the written Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice signed by all parties to this litigation, finds that based upon the agreement of the parties the Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice should be granted and

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the litigation captioned herein, including all complaints, counterclaims, cross-complaints and causes of action of any type by any party, should be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice to the refiling thereof. This Judgment is entered this day of August, 1991.

S/ THOMAS R. BRETT

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the ____ day of August, 1991, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to the following:

Mr. James E. Poe 111 W. 5th, Suite 740 Tulsa, OK 74103

Mr. Michael J. Masterson 2526-A East 71st St. Tulsa, OK 74136 Ms. Jo Anne Deaton Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones Tucker & Gable 2800 Fourth National Bldg. Tulsa, OK 74119

Mr. Randall G. Vaughan 900 Oneok Plaza Tulsa, OK 74103

Larry D. Leonard

NILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

AUG 1 3 1991

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Jac	k (). 8	Silv	er,	Cle	rk
U.S.						

LYNN MARTIN, Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of
Labor,

Plaintiff,

No. 90-C-857-E

LARRY EVANS, an Individual
d/b/a EVANS MINI MART,

JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

Defendant.

Plaintiff's motion for judgment by default came on for consideration. It appears to the Court that on October 9, 1990, this civil action was commenced; that on October 31, 1990, the summons and complaint were served upon defendant, Larry Evans,

doing business as Evans Mini Mart; that on June 27, 1991, the Clerk of the Court entered default against defendant pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; that defendant has not moved pursuant to Rule 55(c) to set aside for good cause shown the entry of default against him; and that defendant is withholding \$2,864.89 in unpaid wages due to nine (9) employees. It is therefore:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant, his officers, agents, servants, employees and all persons in active concert or participation with him be and they hereby are permanently enjoined and restrained from violating the provisions of Sections 7 and 11(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., hereinafter referred to as the Act, in any of the following manners:

- 1. Defendant shall not, contrary to Sections 7 and 15(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2) employ any employee in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the Act, for workweeks longer than forty (40) hours, unless the employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
- 2. Defendant shall not, contrary to Sections 11(c) and 15(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a)(5), fail to make, keep and preserve adequate and accurate records of the persons employed by him, and the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him as prescribed by regulations issued by the Administrator of the Employment Standards Administration, United States Department of Labor (29 C.F.R. Part 516).

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendant be, and is hereby is, enjoined and restrained from withholding payment of overtime compensation in the total amount of \$2,864.89 to which the Court finds is due under the Act to defendant's employees named in Exhibit A attached hereto in the amounts indicated for the period July 1, 1986 through June 19, 1988. To comply with this provision of this judgment, defendant, within sixty (60) days from entry of this judgment, shall deliver to the plaintiff a cashier's or certified check payable to "Employment Standards Administration - Labor" in the total amount

of \$2,864.89, less social security and income tax deductions, the proceeds of which check the plaintiff shall distribute to defendant's employees named herein. Any net sums which within one year after the payment pursuant to this judgment have not been distributed to such employees, or to their estate if necessary, because of plaintiff's inability to locate the proper persons, or because of their refusal to accept such sums, shall be deposited with the Clerk of this Court who shall forthwith deposit such money with the Treasurer of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2041.

It is further ORDERED, that each of the parties shall bear his or her own costs.

Dated	this	day	of	,	1991.

S/ JAMES O. ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT A

Employee		Amo	ount Due
Bill Couch		\$	67.50
L.T. Doolittle			107.25
Bobby Huckaby			280.69
Dee Larimore			18.00
Joy Ramer			606.61
Clarence Rose			461.00
Pansy Stark			647.75
Robin Summa			77.06
Marie Tune			599.03
	Total	\$ 2	,864.89

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA TILL E

AUG 1 3 1991

LELAND STANLEY, Plaintiff,

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

vs.

No. 90-C-702-E

GEORGE M. COLE, et al.,

Defendants.

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSING ORDER

The Defendant, George M. Cole having filed his petition in bankruptcy and the Court having determined that these proceedings should be stayed thereby, it is hereby ordered that the Clerk administratively terminate this action in his records, without prejudice to the rights of the parties to reopen the proceedings for good cause shown for the entry of any stipulation or order, or for any other purpose required to obtain a final determination of the litigation.

If, within twenty (20) days of a final adjudication of the bankruptcy proceedings the parties have not reopened for the purpose of obtaining a final determination herein, this action shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice.

ORDERED this 13 day of August, 1991.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

FILED

AUG 1 3 1991

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LARRY GENE CARNEY and LYNELLE CARNEY,))		
Plaintiffs,)		
vs.) 1	ю.	90-C-1044-E
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,)		
Defendant.)		

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Since both motions address the same legal issue the Court's analysis is applicable to both. Simply put, the issue is whether, under a theory of equitable estoppel, Defendant is barred from denying uninsured motorist coverage under the subject policy.

Defendant first argues that where, as here, an insured releases a tortfeasor without securing the insurer's waiver of its uninsured motorist subrogation rights then uninsured motorist coverage is rendered unavailable to insured. See 36 O.S. §3636(e); Porter v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 643 P.2d 302 (Okla. 1982). Plaintiffs respond that the Porter doctrine is not controlling in this case because Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiffs' May 8, 1989 request for certification of uninsured motorist coverage on the Ford policy amounts to a breach of duty; therefore, Defendant should be estopped from denying coverage. Plaintiffs thus invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in support of their claim. The

Court has reviewed the record and applied the relevant law thereto. The Court has concluded that the evidence before it does not support a finding that Plaintiffs "reasonably and detrimentally" relied on Defendant's failure to respond when they reached settlements with the tortfeasors. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1339 (10th Cir. 1987), citing Burdick v. Independent School District No. 520, 702 P.2d 48, 55 (Okla. 1985). The Court further finds that the Minnesota and South Carolina cases cited by Plaintiffs are distinguishable from the case at bar. Clearly, Defendant cannot be accused of the egregious conduct at issue in the Simmons case. Simmons v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 391 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1990). In American Family, the Court's analysis focused on the adequacy of Plaintiff's notice to her underinsurer of a proposed settlement with a tortfeasor. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumann, 459 N.W.2d 923, 924 (Minn. 1990). The specificity of the notice in that case differs markedly from the May 9, 1989 letter in the instant case. In the Court's view the facts of this case provide inadequate Id. grounds for invocation of the equitable estoppel doctrine.

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment against a party who, after time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2543, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The undisputed material facts of this case lead to the conclusion that under the teachings of Celotex and its progeny,

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
- Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied;
- Judgment is entered for Defendant.
 ORDERED this <u>13</u>⁷⁴ day of August, 1991.

JAMES 🖋 ELLISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CHERYL J. VOSS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation; and ED KEDZIOR, an individual,

Defendants.

AUG 1991

JACI. CHEVEROS ERK
U.S CISTRICY COURT

Case No. 90-C-135-B

FILED

AUG 13 1991

Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT

<u>ORDER</u>

UPON the Joint Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice filed herein by the parties, it is hereby

United States District Judge

LARRY D. DEAN,	FILE D
Plaintiff,	AUG 1 2 1991 W
vs.)	Jack C. Silver, Clerk U.S. DISTRICT COURT
LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.	CASE NO. 91-C-165-C
Defendant.	(CASE NO. 31-C-103-C)

ORDER

Upon the Motion of Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, by Tony M. Graham, Untied States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, through Kathleen Bliss Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, and for good cause shown it is hereby ORDERED that the above-styled case be remanded to the Defendant for further administrative action.

Dated this ________, 1991.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SUBMITTED BY:

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

3900 U.S. Courthouse

Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103

(918) 581-7463

(Sully 3

FOR THE NORTHER	FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) AUG 12 1991
vs.	Jack C. Silver, Cark U.S. DISTRICT COURT
RICHARD D. RIDER)
Defendant.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 91-C-465-C

AGREED JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PAYMENT

Plaintiff, the United States of America, having filed its Complaint herein, and the defendant, having consented to the making and entry of this Judgment without trial, hereby agree as follows:

- 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation and over all parties thereto. The Complaint filed herein states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The defendant hereby acknowledges and accepts service of the Complaint filed herein.
- 3. The defendant hereby agrees to the entry of Judgment in the principal sum of \$1,648.78, accrued interest in the amount of \$124.22, administrative costs in the amount of \$87.00, plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum, plus interest thereafter at the legal rate until paid, plus costs of this action, until paid in full.
- 4. Plaintiff's consent to the entry of this Judgment and Order of Payment is based upon certain financial information which defendant has provided it and the defendant's express representation to Plaintiff that he is unable to presently pay

NOTE: THIS ORDER IS TO BE MAILED
BY MOVANT TO ALL COUNSEL AND
PRO SE LITIGANTS IMMEDIATELY,
UPON RECEIPT.

the amount of indebtedness in full and the further representation of the defendant that he will well and truly honor and comply with the Order of Payment entered herein which provides terms and conditions for the defendant's payment of the Judgment, together with costs and accrued interest, in regular monthly installment payments, as follows:

- (a) Beginning on or before the 1st day of August, 1991, the defendant shall tender to the United States a check or money order payable to the U.S. Department of Justice, in the amount of \$100.00, and a like sum every two weeks after that time until the entire amount of the Judgment, together with the costs and accrued postjudgment interest, is paid in full.
- (b) The defendant shall mail each monthly installment payment to: United States Attorney, Debt Collection Unit, 3600 U.S. Courthouse, 333 West 4th Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103.
- (c) Each said payment made by defendant shall be applied in accordance with the U.S. Rules, <u>i.e.</u>, first to the payment of costs, second to the payment of postjudgment interest (as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961) accrued to the date of the receipt of said payment, and the balance, if any, to the principal.
- 4. Default under the terms of this Agreed Judgment will entitle the United States to execute on this Judgment without notice to the defendant.
- 5. The defendant has the right of prepayment of this debt without penalty.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

Plaintiff have and recover judgment against the Defendant, Richard D. Rider, in the principal amount of \$1,648.78, accrued interest in the amount of \$124.22, administrative costs in the amount of \$87.00, interest at the rate of 8% per annum, plus interest thereafter at the current legal rate of percent per annum until paid, plus the costs of this action.

(Staned) N. Dale Cook

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

TONY M. GRAHAM

United States Attorney

KATHLEEN BLISS ADAMS

Assistant United States Attorney

RICHARD D. RIDER.

Debtor